

- DECISION -

Claimant:
PEGGY A RITTER

Decision No.: 1120-BR-13

Date: March 20, 2013

Appeal No.: 1239333

Employer:
TWO FARMS INC

S.S. No.:

L.O. No.: 64

Appellant: Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct or gross misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 8-1002 or 1003.

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200.

The period for filing an appeal expires: April 19, 2013

REVIEW OF THE RECORD

After a review of the record, the Board adopts the following findings of fact and reverses the hearing examiner's decision.

The claimant was employed as a full-time assistant manager from October 18, 2012 through October 22, 2012. The claimant is unemployed as the result of a discharge.

The claimant was discharged based on alleged poor or alleged rude service from several unnamed customer complaints to the employer's corporate office.

The claimant's store was often short-staffed. The claimant worked to the best of her ability. The claimant was not intentionally rude to customers and operated in the most efficient manner possible. Notwithstanding, the claimant was discharged based upon the unnamed customer complaints.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training, 309 Md. 28 (1987)*.

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d)*; *COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83*; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85*; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87*; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89*; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998)*, "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005).

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (See, *Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113*).

Simple misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1003 does not require intentional misbehavior. *DLLR v. Hider*, 349 Md. 71 (1998); also see *Johns Hopkins University v. Board of Labor, Licensing and Regulation*, 134 Md. App. 653, 662-63 (2000)(psychiatric condition which prevented claimant from conforming his/her conduct to accepted norms did not except that conduct from the category of misconduct under § 8-1003). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. *Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd.*, 218 Md. 504 (1959). Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make an act connected with the work. *Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202 (1958). Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. *Id.*

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc.*, 221-BR-89. Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman*, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998).

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones*, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989). "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct...but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct.'" *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)(internal citation omitted); also see *Hernandez v. DLLR*, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998).

Aggravated misconduct is an amplification of gross misconduct where the claimant engages in "behavior committed with actual malice and deliberate disregard for the property, safety or life of others that...affects the employer, fellow employees, subcontractors, invitees of the employer, members of the public, or the ultimate consumer of the employer's products or services...and consists of either a physical assault or property loss so serious that the penalties of misconduct or gross misconduct are not sufficient."

In the instant case, the employer's case was substantially hearsay. The employer rested its case upon out-of-court statements / complaints from unnamed customers. These statements were not under oath or affidavit, not independently corroborated, and offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The employer's witness had not first-hand knowledge of the alleged events.

Although the hearing examiner may rely on hearsay evidence in making his determination, the hearing examiner must, "first carefully consider[] its reliability and probative value." *Travers v. Baltimore Police Dept.*, 115 Md. App. 395, 413 (1997). "The Court has remained steadfast in reminding agencies that to be admissible in an adjudicatory proceeding, hearsay evidence must demonstrate sufficient reliability and probative value to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process." *Id.* at 411. See also *Kade v. Charles H. Hickey School*, 80 Md. App. 721, 725 (1989) ("[e]ven though hearsay is admissible, there are limits on its use. The hearsay must be competent and have probative force.").

One important consideration for a hearing body is the nature of the hearsay evidence. For instance, statements that are sworn under oath, see *Kade*, 80 Md. App. at 726, 566 A.2d at 151, *Eichberg v. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy*, 50 Md. App. 189, 194, 436 A.2d 525, 529, or made close in time to the incident, see *Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971), or corroborated, see *Consolidated Edison v. N.L.R.B.*, 305 U.S. 197, 230, 83 L. Ed. 126, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938) ("mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence"); *Wallace v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Bd.*, 294 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. 1972), ordinarily is presumed to possess a greater caliber of reliability. Cited in *Travers* 115 Md. App. at 413. Also see *Parham v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation*, 985 A.2d 147, 155 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009). Also see *Cook v. National Aquarium in Baltimore*, 1034-BR-91 (the employer offered not a single specific example of the alleged misconduct as observed by either of the employer's witnesses and no documents were introduced relating to any specific instance of misconduct. The employer offered only conclusory statements that the claimant engaged in a certain type of misconduct).

The hearing examiner made no such examination into the reliability of the hearsay evidence in his evaluation of the evidence in this case.

As the Court of Appeals has noted, for a reviewing court to perform properly its examination function, an administrative decision must contain factual findings on all the material issues of a case and a clear, explicit statement of the agency's rationale. *Harford County v. Preston*, 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991). A fully explained administrative decision also fulfills another purpose; it recognizes the "fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before an administrative agency to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision . . ." *Id.*; also see *Mehrling v. Nationwide Ins. Co.*, 371 Md. 40, 56 (2002); *Fowler v. Motor Vehicle Administration*, 394 Md. 331, 353 (2006); *Crumlish v. Insurance Commissioner*, 70 Md. App. 182, 187 (1987).

In *Kade v. Charles H. Hickey School*, the Court of Special Appeals reversed a decision by an administrative agency for similarly relying on hearsay evidence without establishing the reliability of that evidence. In *Kade*, a school employee appealed his suspension by his employer for disrespectful conduct towards a fellow employee. At the hearing before the administrative agency, the superintendent of the school was the only witness for the employer. The superintendent testified that he was not present on the night of the incident and that all of the information he possessed was based on statements given to him. The Court found the agency's reliance on the hearsay statements submitted by the superintendent to be improper.

Even though the statements were relevant, *there was no indication that this hearsay evidence was reliable, credible or competent.* The statements which were submitted by appellant's co workers are not under oath and do not reflect how they were obtained.... No reason was given as to why the declarants were unavailable.

The Court's rejection of the administrative agency's use of hearsay evidence in *Kade* applies with equal force to the hearing examiner and the Board in this case.

In the instant case, the claimant was not made aware of the complaints until several days or up to a week after the alleged events. The claimant explained she worked to the best of her ability, especially when the store was short-staffed, she followed instructions and was never intentionally rude to any customer. She did remember telling a customer that it would take fifteen minutes to cook a new batch of chicken. This statement was not rude- it was stating a fact.

The employer's witness' contentions regarding the condition of the store when the claimant was in charge has no merit. The witness was not present at these times and did not testify from first-hand knowledge. The only evidence the employer's witness had was uncorroborated hearsay statements. There is insufficient evidence that the claimant was negligent in her duties in this regard.

The Board gives more weight to the claimant's first-hand testimony. The customers who lodged the complaints were not present as the employer's witnesses, were not subject to cross-examination and were not under oath at the time they made their statements. There are no written complaints from the customers in the record. The employer's evidence is of little probative value.

The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1003. The hearing examiner's decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.

DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged, but not for gross misconduct or misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002 or 1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment with TWO FARMS INC.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.



Clayton A. Mitchell, Sr., Associate Member



Eileen M. Rehrmann, Associate Member

KJK

Copies mailed to:

PEGGY A. RITTER

TWO FARMS INC

ROYAL FARMS

Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION

PEGGY A RITTER

SSN #

Claimant

vs.

TWO FARMS INC

Employer/Agency

Before the:

**Maryland Department of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation**

Division of Appeals

1100 North Eutaw Street

Room 511

Baltimore, MD 21201

(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1239333

Appellant: Claimant

Local Office : 64 / BALTOMETRO
CALL CENTER

December 20, 2012

For the Claimant: PRESENT

For the Employer: PRESENT, TONYA HESS

For the Agency:

ISSUE(S)

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD. Code Annotated Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 1002 - 1002.1 (Gross/Aggravated Misconduct connected with the work), 1003 (Misconduct connected with the work) or 1001 (Voluntary Quit for good cause).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The claimant, Peggy Ritter, opened a claim for unemployment insurance benefits and established a benefit year beginning October 21, 2012 and qualified for a weekly benefit amount of \$430.

The claimant worked for the employer, Two Farms Inc. from October 18, 2003 through October 22, 2012. Her last actual day of work was October 18, 2012. At the time of separation, the claimant was working full time as an assistant manager and was paid \$16 an hour. The claimant was discharged for poor customer service.

The last incident that led to the claimant's discharge occurred on October 13, 2012 when she told a customer she was waiting on that the store had no fresh chicken and the customer would have to wait until all the old chicken had been sold before she would cook anymore. The customer also noted that the store was dirty. The customer's complaint came to the attention of the employer's district leader on October 17, 2012. The claimant was suspended from work and formally discharged on October 22, 2012.

Previously, the claimant had been suspended three days due to complaints the employer received about her when they visited the store on Memorial Day May 28, 2012. One customer complained that the claimant took his or her order but then had to wait at least eight minutes while the claimant served two other customers that had entered the store after they did. A second customer complained that he or she was told that they would have to wait at least 15 minutes before she could wait on them because she had to cook some chicken. The claimant was warned that she would be terminated if there was another occurrence. The claimant had also received a written warning in November 2011 for unprofessional conduct to a customer which included cursing.

The claimant was often required to work without enough help to accomplish all her tasks and often with few if any breaks during her shift.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003 provides for a disqualification from benefits where the claimant is discharged or suspended as a disciplinary measure for misconduct connected with the work. The term "misconduct" is undefined in the statute but has been defined as "...a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee, within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer's premises." Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 132 (1974).

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1002 provides that an individual shall be disqualified from receiving benefits where he or she is discharged or suspended from employment because of behavior which demonstrates gross misconduct. The statute defines gross misconduct as conduct that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards that an employer has a right to expect and that shows a gross indifference to the employer's interests. Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202, 145 A.2d 840 (1958); Painter v. Department of Emp. & Training, et al., 68 Md. App. 356, 511 A.2d 585 (1986); Department of Economic and Employment Dev. v. Hager, 96 Md. App. 362, 625 A.2d 342 (1993).

Md. Code, Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1002 provides that an individual shall be disqualified from receiving benefits when he or she was discharged or suspended from employment because of behavior that demonstrates gross misconduct. The statute defines gross misconduct as repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE

The Hearing Examiner considered all of the testimony and evidence of record in reaching this decision. Where the evidence was in conflict, the Hearing Examiner decided the facts on the credible evidence as determined by the Hearing Examiner.

The employer had the burden to show, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the claimant was discharged for some degree of misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. Ivey v. Catterton Printing Company, 441-BH-89. In the case at bar, that burden has been met.


The customer complaints received by the employer all referred to the claimant's rudeness towards them and her lack of hospitality. Given the stress the claimant was under that is understandable but the claimant behavior must have been a consistent problems for so many customers to take the time to make a formal complaint to the employer. Hence, it is held that the claimant was discharged for simple misconduct in this case and will received a more limited penalty on her request for unemployment insurance benefits.

I hold that the claimant committed a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or engaged in a course of wrongful conduct within the scope of the claimant's employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer's premises. An unemployment disqualification shall be imposed based on Md. Code, Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003 pursuant to this separation from this employment.

DECISION

IT IS HELD THAT the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003. Benefits are denied for the week beginning October 14, 2012 and for the fourteen weeks immediately following. The claimant will then be eligible for benefits so long as all other eligibility requirements are met. The claimant may contact Claimant Information Service concerning the other eligibility requirements of the law at ui@dllr.state.md.us or call 410-949-0022 from the Baltimore region, or 1-800-827-4839 from outside the Baltimore area. Deaf claimants with TTY may contact Client Information Service at 410-767-2727, or outside the Baltimore area at 1-800-827-4400.

The determination of the Claims Specialist is reversed.



S Selby, Esq.
Hearing Examiner

Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment.

This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.

Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.

Notice of Right of Further Appeal

Any party may request a further appeal either in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A(1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by January 04, 2013. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals
1100 North Eutaw Street
Room 515
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Fax 410-767-2787
Phone 410-767-2781

NOTE: Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.

Date of hearing: December 10, 2012
DAH/Specialist ID: WHG63
Seq No: 001
Copies mailed on December 20, 2012 to:
PEGGY A. RITTER
TWO FARMS INC
LOCAL OFFICE #64
ROYAL FARMS