

- DECISION -

Claimant:	Decision No.:	1876-BR-13
KELVIN M THOMAS	Date:	May 8, 2013
	Appeal No.:	1301130
	S.S. No.:	
Employer:	L.O. No.:	61
TARGET DIV OF DAYTON HUDSON	Appellant:	Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct or gross misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 8-1002 or 1003.

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200.

The period for filing an appeal expires: June 7, 2013

REVIEW OF THE RECORD

After a review of the record, and after deleting "or about" from the first and third sentences of the first paragraph, and from the first sentence of the second paragraph, the Board adopts the hearing examiner's modified findings of fact but reaches a different conclusion of law. Additionally the Board finds that the claimant was discharged for the single incident of engaging in a brief argument with a co-worker.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit

of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., §8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training, 309 Md. 28 (1987)*.

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d); COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83; Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85; Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87; Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89; Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998)*, "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005).

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (*See, Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113*).

Simple misconduct within the meaning of §8-1003 does not require intentional misbehavior. *DLLR v. Hider, 349 Md. 71 (1998)*; also see *Johns Hopkins University v. Board of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 134 Md. App. 653, 662-63 (2000)*(psychiatric condition which prevented claimant from conforming his/her conduct to accepted norms did not except that conduct from the category of misconduct under §8-1003). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. *Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd., 218 Md. 504 (1959)*. Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make

an act connected with the work. *Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202 (1958). Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. *Id.*

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc.*, 221-BR-89. Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman*, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998).

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones*, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989). "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct...but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct.'" *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)(internal citation omitted); also see *Hernandez v. DLLR*, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998).

The employer did not sufficiently demonstrate that the claimant's actions were more than a mere isolated incident. See *Proctor v. Atlas Pontiac*, 144-BR-87 (An instantaneous lapse in the performance of job duties does not constitute misconduct); also see *Gilbert v. Polo Grill*, 192-BH-91 (One slight lapse in the claimant's performance is insufficient to support a finding of misconduct). In the light most favorable to the employer, the claimant failed to use good judgment by not notifying the employer of his physical condition and requesting a replacement. Failing to use good judgment, or an isolated case of ordinary negligence, in the absence of a showing of culpable negligence or deliberate action in disregard of the employer's interests is insufficient to prove misconduct. *Hider v. DLLR*, 115 Md. App. 258, 281 (1997); *Greenwood v. Royal Crown Bottling Company*, 793-BR-88.

In his appeal, the claimant offers no specific contentions of error as to the findings of fact or the conclusions of law in the hearing examiner's decision. The claimant does not cite to the evidence of record and makes no other contentions of error. The claimant simply states his wish to appeal the decision and an apparent overpayment assessment.

On appeal, the Board reviews the evidence of record from the Lower Appeals hearing. The Board will not order the taking of additional evidence or a new hearing unless there has been clear error, a defect in the record, or a failure of due process. The record is complete. Both parties appeared and testified. Both parties were given the opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses and to offer and object to documentary evidence. Both parties were offered closing statements. The necessary elements of due process were observed throughout the hearing. The Board finds no reason to order a new hearing or take additional evidence in this matter.

The Board has thoroughly reviewed the record from the hearing and concurs with the hearing examiner's findings of fact, as modified. The Board finds, however, that this single isolated incident of engaging in an argument with a co-worker does not rise to the level of misconduct. The employer's evidence was vague and inconclusive as to whether the claimant and his co-worker did any more than argue for less than

one minute. There was nothing physical about the altercation and no threats were made or implied. Neither the claimant nor his co-worker did anything beyond speak loudly to each other for a few moments. No customers were in the store and no other employees were involved. There was no evidence that this was part of a course of conduct by the claimant.

Certainly such an incident may give the employer sufficient reason to discharge an employee. However, absent some specific evidence of actual misconduct, the Board cannot find the claimant's separation to be disqualifying and cannot find that a benefit penalty is appropriate. Because the Board is reversing the hearing examiner's decision and finding no disqualification, there should be no overpayment as a result of this matter.

The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer has not met its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of misconduct within the meaning of §8-1003. The decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.

DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged, but not for gross misconduct or misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002 or 1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment with TARGET DIV OF DAYTON HUDSON

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.



Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson



Eileen M. Rehrmann, Associate Member

VD/mw

Copies mailed to:

KELVIN M. THOMAS

TARGET DIV OF DAYTON HUDSON

TARGET STORES T-2133

Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION

KELVIN M THOMAS

SSN #

Claimant

vs.

TARGET DIV OF DAYTON HUDSON

Employer/Agency

Before the:

**Maryland Department of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation**

Division of Appeals

1100 North Eutaw Street

Room 511

Baltimore, MD 21201

(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1301130

Appellant: Employer

Local Office : 61 / COLLEGE PARK
CLAIM CENTER

February 07, 2013

For the Claimant: PRESENT

For the Employer: PRESENT, PEARL OKAN, MOUSSA DINE

For the Agency:

ISSUE(S)

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD Code Annotated Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 8-1001 (voluntary quit for good cause), 8-1002 - 1002.1 (gross/aggravated misconduct connected with the work) or 8-1003 (misconduct connected with the work).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The claimant, Kelvin Thomas, began working for this employer on or about March 30, 2012. At the time of separation, the claimant was working as a team member. The claimant last worked for the employer on or about November 24, 2012, before being terminated.

On or about November 12, 2012, the claimant was arguing with a co-worker. The claimant was dragging two flats which was a violation of policy. He asked a co-worker for help and the co-worker did not provide help. The argument became loud and a bit heated but no threats were made. The claimant was friendly with the person he argued with, and they were just blowing off steam. The argument lasted less than a minute. Two team members separated the claimant and his co-worker. The argument occurred before work hours, and no customers were in the store.

The claimant was told that he was not going to be fired for this argument. The employer apparently changed its mind and decided to terminate the claimant.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003 provides for a disqualification from benefits where the claimant is discharged or suspended as a disciplinary measure for misconduct connected with the work. The term "misconduct" is undefined in the statute but has been defined as "...a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee, within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer's premises." Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 132 (1974).

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

The Hearing Examiner considered all of the testimony and evidence of record in reaching this decision. Where the evidence was in conflict, the Hearing Examiner decided the Facts on the credible evidence as determined by the Hearing Examiner.

The employer had the burden to show, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the claimant was discharged for some degree of misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. Ivey v. Catterton Printing Company, 441-BH-89. In the case at bar, that burden has been met.


The claimant had an inappropriate interaction with a co-worker at the workplace. There was no violence or threat of violence, but it was still not appropriate. The actions are not serious enough to establish gross misconduct. However, the claimant did act inappropriately and a finding of simply misconduct is warranted.

I hold that the claimant committed a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or engaged in a course of wrongful conduct within the scope of the claimant's employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer's premises. An unemployment disqualification shall be imposed based on Md. Code, Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003 pursuant to this separation from this employment.

DECISION

IT IS HELD THAT the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003. Benefits are denied for the week beginning November 18, 2012, and for the nine weeks immediately following. The claimant will then be eligible for benefits so long as all other eligibility requirements are met. The claimant may contact Claimant Information Service concerning the other eligibility requirements of the law at ui@dllr.state.md.us or call 410-949-0022 from the Baltimore region, or 1-800-827-4839 from outside the Baltimore area. Deaf claimants with TTY may contact Client Information Service at 410-767-2727, or outside the Baltimore area at 1-800-827-4400.

The determination of the Claims Specialist is reversed.



B F Sapp, Esq.
Hearing Examiner

Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment. This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.

Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.

Notice of Right of Further Appeal

Any party may request a further appeal either in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A(1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by February 22, 2013. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals
1100 North Eutaw Street
Room 515
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Fax 410-767-2787
Phone 410-767-2781

NOTE: Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.

Date of hearing: January 29, 2013

BLP/Specialist ID: WCP6E

Seq No: 001

Copies mailed on February 07, 2013 to:

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TARGET DIV OF DAYTON HUDSON
LOCAL OFFICE #61