

**- DECISION -**

Claimant:  
ROBERT W BARNES

Decision No.: 2406-BR-14

Date: September 10, 2014

Appeal No.: 1403664

S.S. No.:

Employer:  
SERVICE PARTS CO M C WREHS INC  
MICHAEL SNYDER

L.O. No.: 63

Appellant: Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1001.

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**- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -**

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200.

The period for filing an appeal expires: October 10, 2014

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**REVIEW OF THE RECORD**

After a review of the record, the Board adopts the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the Board modifies the decision.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification

provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training*, 309 Md. 28 (1987).

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d)*; *COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

A threshold issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the claimant was discharged. For the following reasons, the Board affirms the hearing examiner's decision on this issue.

The burden of proof in this case is allocated according to whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the employer discharged the claimant. In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc.*, 164-BH-83; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc.*, 30-BR-85; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation*, 869-BH-87; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction*, 347-BH-89; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co.*, 441-BH-89.

When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, he has the burden of proving that he left for good cause or valid circumstances based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hargrove v. City of Baltimore*, 2033-BH-83; *Chisholm v. Johns Hopkins Hospital*, 66-BR-89. Purely personal reasons, no matter how compelling, cannot constitute good cause as a matter of law. *Bd. Of Educ. Of Montgomery County v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985). An objective standard is used to determine if the average employee would have left work in that situation; in addition, a determination is made as to whether a particular employee left in good faith, and an element of good faith is whether the claimant has exhausted all reasonable alternatives before leaving work. *Board of Educ. v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985); also see *Bohrer v. Sheetz, Inc.*, Law No. 13361, (Cir. Ct. for Washington Co., Apr. 24, 1984). The "necessitous or compelling" requirement relating to a cause for leaving work voluntarily does not apply to "good cause". *Board of Educ. v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985). A resignation in lieu of discharge is a discharge under §§ 8-1002, 8-1002.1, and 8-1003. *Miller v. William T. Burnette and Company, Inc.*, 442-BR-82.

The intent to discharge or the intent to voluntarily quit can be manifested by words or actions. "Due to leaving work voluntarily" has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally and of his or her own free will, terminated the employment. *Allen v. Core Target Youth Program*, 275 Md. 69 (1975). A claimant's intent or state of mind is a factual issue for the Board of Appeals to resolve. *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Taylor*, 108 Md. 250(1996), *aff'd sub. nom.*, 344 Md. 687 (1997).

An intent to quit one's job can be manifested by actions as well as words. *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company*, 1101-BH-82. A resignation submitted in response to charges which *might* lead to discharge is a voluntary quit. *Hickman v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.*, 973-BR-88; *Brewington v. Dept. of Social Services*, 1500-BH-82; *Roffe v. South Carolina Wateroe River Correction Institute*, 576-

BR-88 (where a claimant quit because he feared a discharge was imminent, but he had not been informed that he was discharged is without good cause or valid circumstances); also see *Cofield v. Apex Grounds Management, Inc.*, 309-BR-91. When a claimant receives a medical leave of absence but is still believes she is unable to return upon the expiration of that leave and expresses that she will not return to work for an undefinable period, the claimant is held to have voluntarily quit. See *Sortino v. Western Auto Supply*, 896-BR-83.

The intent to discharge can be manifested by actions as well as words. The issue is whether the reasonable person in the position of the claimant believed in good faith that he was discharged. See *Dei Svaldi v. Martin Taubenfeld, D.D.S., P.A.*, 1074-BR-88 (the claimant was discharged after a telephone conversation during which she stated her anger at the employer and the employer stated to her, "If that's the way you feel, then you might as well not come in anymore." The claimant's reply of "Fine" does not make it a quit). Compare, *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company*, 1101-BH-82. A quit in lieu of discharge is a discharge for unemployment insurance purposes. *Tressler v. Anchor Motor Freight*, 105-BR-83.

The Board finds the weight of the credible evidence supports a finding that there was continued work available for the claimant on the reasonable condition that the claimant could not bring his son to work with him. Therefore, the Board concurs with the hearing examiner's conclusion that the claimant was the person who initiated the separation from employment and manifested the requisite intent to voluntarily quit.

Finding that the claimant voluntarily quit, the Board shall now examine whether it was for a disqualifying reason.

There are two categories of non-disqualifying reasons for quitting employment. When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, he has the burden of proving that he left for good cause or valid circumstances based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hargrove v. City of Baltimore*, 2033-BH-83; *Chisholm v. Johns Hopkins Hospital*, 66-BR-89.

Quitting for "good cause" is the first non-disqualifying reason. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-1001(b)*. Purely personal reasons, no matter how compelling, cannot constitute good cause as a matter of law. *Bd. Of Educ. Of Montgomery County v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22, 28 (1985). An objective standard is used to determine if the average employee would have left work in that situation; in addition, a determination is made as to whether a particular employee left in good faith, and an element of good faith is whether the claimant has exhausted all reasonable alternatives before leaving work. *Board of Educ. v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22, 29-30 (1985)(requiring a "higher standard of proof" than for good cause because reason is not job related); also see *Bohrer v. Sheetz, Inc.*, Law No. 13361, (Cir. Ct. for Washington Co., Apr. 24, 1984). "Good cause" must be job-related and it must be a cause "which would reasonably impel the average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment." *Paynter*, 303 Md. at 1193. Using this definition, the Court of Appeals held that the Board correctly applied the "objective test": "The applicable standards are the standards of reasonableness applied to the average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive." *Paynter*, 303 Md. at 1193.

The second category or non-disqualifying reason is quitting for "valid circumstances". *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-1001(c)(1)*. There are two types of valid circumstances: a valid circumstance may be (1) a substantial cause that is job-related or (2) a factor that is non-job related but is "necessitous or compelling". *Paynter 202 Md. at 30*. The "necessitous or compelling" requirement relating to a cause for leaving work voluntarily does not apply to "good cause". *Board of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 30 (1985)*. In a case where medical problems are at issue, mere compliance with the requirement of supplying a written statement or other documentary evidence of a health problem does not mandate an automatic award of benefits. *Shifflet v. Dept. of Emp. & Training, 75 Md. App. 282 (1988)*.

Section 8-1001 of the Labor and Employment Article provides that individuals shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits where their unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily, without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer or without, valid circumstances. A circumstance for voluntarily leaving work is valid if it is a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit or of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual had no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

In the instant case the claimant quit for personal reasons which cannot be good cause within the meaning of § 8-1001(b) or valid circumstances within the meaning of § 8-1001(c)(1)(i) as a matter of law.

However, the Board is cognizant of the claimant's need for finding care for his son. The employer's short notice truncated the claimant's opportunity to secure adequate care for his son in order to comply with the employer's otherwise reasonable directive. Therefore, the claimant had no other reasonable alternative but to voluntarily quit his position. The Board finds sufficient evidence that the claimant demonstrated necessitous and compelling reasons for quitting and that all reasonable alternatives were exhausted prior to quitting; therefore, a finding of valid circumstances within the meaning of § 8-1001(c)(1)(ii) is supported.

The Board does not concur with the hearing examiner's penalty. The Board finds on the facts of this case, only the minimum five-week penalty is warranted.

The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the claimant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he quit for good cause within the meaning of § 8-1001.

However, the Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the claimant met his burden of demonstrating that he quit for valid circumstances within the meaning of § 8-1001. The minimum five-week penalty is measured and appropriate on the facts of this case.


The hearing examiner's decision shall be modified for the reasons stated herein.

The employer should note that, provided that it has not elected to be a reimbursing employer pursuant to *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Emp. Art. § 8-616*, any benefits paid to the claimant as a result of this decision shall not affect its earned (tax) rating record. *See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-611(e)(1)*.

### DECISION

It is held that the claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause but for valid circumstances, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1001. The claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits from the week beginning January 5, 2014 and the 4 weeks immediately following.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is modified.



Clayton A. Mitchell, Sr., Associate Member



Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson

VD

Copies mailed to:

ROBERT W. BARNES

SERVICE PARTS CO M C WREHS INC

Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

**UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION**

ROBERT W BARNES

SSN #

**Claimant**

Vs.

SERVICE PARTS CO M C WREHS INC  
MICHAEL SNYDER

**Employer/Agency**

Before the:

**Maryland Department of Labor,  
Licensing and Regulation  
Division of Appeals**  
1100 North Eutaw Street  
Room 511  
Baltimore, MD 21201  
(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1403664  
Appellant: Claimant  
Local Office : 63 / CUMBERLAND  
CLAIM CENTER

March 19, 2014

**For the Claimant:** PRESENT

**For the Employer:** PRESENT, MICHAEL SNYDER

**For the Agency:**

**ISSUE(S)**

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD. Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 1001 (Voluntary Quit for good cause), 1002 - 1002.1 (Gross/Aggravated Misconduct connected with the work), or 1003 (Misconduct connected with the work).

**FINDINGS OF FACT**

The claimant, Robert Barnes, began working for the employer, Service Parts Co. (d/b/a "PAPA Auto Parts"), in or about 2004. At the time of separation, the claimant was employed as an assistant manager. The claimant last worked for the employer on or about January 10, 2014, at which time the employer advised him that he could no longer (after heretofore condoning it) bring his disabled adult son to work with him. The claimant's son's presence in the workplace presented a potential safety and/or liability issue. The claimant was unable to make alternative arrangements on short notice.

**CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits when unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily. The Court of Appeals



interpreted Section 8-1001 in Allen v. CORE Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975): “As we see it, the phrase ‘leaving work voluntarily’ has a plain, definite and sensible meaning...; it expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally, of his or her own free will, terminated the employment.” 275 Md. at 79.

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits where unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer, or without valid circumstances. A circumstance is valid only if it is (i) a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit; or (ii) of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

### EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE


The Hearing Examiner considered all of the testimony and evidence of record in reaching this decision. Where the evidence was in conflict, the Hearing Examiner decided the Facts on the credible evidence as determined by the Hearing Examiner.

The evidence presented at the hearing suggested that the claimant’s departure was not “voluntary,” in the strict sense of that term. Although there was conflicting testimony presented as to whether he had “quit” or had been “discharged,” it was nevertheless established that there was continuing work available for the claimant, albeit under the revised conditions established by the employer. Accordingly, and notwithstanding how the respective parties desired to characterize it, the separation must be considered as a quit for the purpose of applying Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. As such, the claimant has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the separation was for a reason which constitutes either good cause or valid circumstances. Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83. The claimant failed to show that the employer’s decision (to discontinue its previous practice of allowing the claimant’s son on the premises) was patently unreasonable or otherwise undertaken in bad faith. Accordingly, a determination of good cause is not warranted. Nevertheless, given the claimant’s longstanding reliance upon the prior accommodation, the newly established conditions constituted a sufficiently substantial cause so as to support a finding of valid circumstances, within the meaning of Section 8-1001. The statute imposes a mitigated penalty. The benefit determination shall be modified accordingly.

### DECISION

IT IS HELD THAT the claimant's unemployment was due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause, but with valid circumstances within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001. The claimant is disqualified for the week beginning January 5, 2014, and for the nine weeks immediately following. The claimant will then be eligible for benefits so long as all other eligibility requirements are met. The claimant may contact Claimant Information Service concerning the other eligibility requirements of the law at [ui@dllr.state.md.us](mailto:ui@dllr.state.md.us) or call 410-949-0022 from the Baltimore region, or 1-800-827-4839 from outside the Baltimore area. Deaf claimants with TTY may contact Client Information Service at 410-767-2727, or outside the Baltimore area at 1-800-827-4400.

The determination of the Claims Specialist is modified.



E B Steinberg, Esq.  
Hearing Examiner

### **Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment**

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment. This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

**A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.**

**Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.**

### **Notice of Right of Further Appeal**

This is a final decision of the Lower Appeals Division. Any party who disagrees with this decision may request a further appeal either in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A (1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by April 03, 2014. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals  
1100 North Eutaw Street  
Room 515  
Baltimore, Maryland 21201  
Fax 410-767-2787  
Phone 410-767-2781

**NOTE:** Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.



Date of hearing: March 05, 2014  
AEH/Specialist ID: WCU42  
Seq No: 002  
Copies mailed on March 19, 2014 to:

ROBERT W. BARNES  
SERVICE PARTS CO M C WREHS INC  
LOCAL OFFICE #63