

- DECISION -

Claimant:
PAMELA J BARNES

Decision No.: 2930-BR-12

Date: June 04, 2012

Appeal No.: 1210926

S.S. No.:

Employer:
DIVERSIFIED SRVC CONTRACTING

L.O. No.: 60

Appellant: Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct or gross misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 8-1002 or 1003.

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200.

The period for filing an appeal expires: July 04, 2012

REVIEW OF THE RECORD

After a review of the record, the Board adopts the hearing examiner's findings of fact. The Board makes the following additional finding of fact:

The claimant was discharged for a single incident of returning late from lunch on one occasion.

Based on the facts now found, the Board concludes that a different conclusion of law is warranted and reverses the hearing examiner's decision.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., §8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training, 309 Md. 28 (1987)*.

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d)*; *COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83*; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85*; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87*; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89*; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998)*, "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005).

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (*See, Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113*).

Simple misconduct within the meaning of §8-1003 does not require intentional misbehavior. *DLLR v. Hider, 349 Md. 71 (1998)*; also see *Johns Hopkins University v. Board of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 134 Md. App. 653, 662-63 (2000)*(psychiatric condition which prevented claimant from conforming his/her conduct to accepted norms did not except that conduct from the category of

misconduct under §8-1003). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. *Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd.*, 218 Md. 504 (1959). Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make an act connected with the work. *Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202 (1958). Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. *Id.*

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc.*, 221-BR-89. Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman*, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998).

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones*, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989). "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct...but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct.'" *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)(internal citation omitted); also see *Hernandez v. DLLR*, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998).

The employer did not sufficiently demonstrate that the claimant's actions were more than a mere isolated incident. See *Proctor v. Atlas Pontiac*, 144-BR-87 (An instantaneous lapse in the performance of job duties does not constitute misconduct); also see *Gilbert v. Polo Grill*, 192-BH-91 (One slight lapse in the claimant's performance is insufficient to support a finding of misconduct). In the light most favorable to the employer, the claimant failed to use good judgment by not notifying the employer of his physical condition and requesting a replacement. Failing to use good judgment, or an isolated case of ordinary negligence, in the absence of a showing of culpable negligence or deliberate action in disregard of the employer's interests is insufficient to prove misconduct. *Hider v. DLLR*, 115 Md. App. 258, 281 (1997); *Greenwood v. Royal Crown Bottling Company*, 793-BR-88.

In her appeal the claimant offers no contentions of error as to the findings of fact or the conclusions of law in the hearing examiner's decision. The claimant does not cite to the evidence of record and makes no other contentions of error. She merely states she: "...would like to be scheduled a hearing because I disagree..." On appeal, the Board reviews the evidence of record from the Lower Appeals hearing. The Board will not order the taking of additional evidence or a new hearing unless there has been clear error, a defect in the record, or a failure of due process. The Board has thoroughly reviewed the record from the hearing. While the Board concurs with the hearing examiner's findings of fact, the Board does not agree with the conclusions of law or the decision.

The employer's evidence was almost exclusively hearsay. The claimant's evidence was first-hand. Hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, but is generally not given the evidentiary weight of first-hand evidence. The claimant admitted to being late returning from her lunch break on January 27, 2012. That admission is the only competent evidence in the record.

The hearing examiner apparently placed some significance on the fact that the claimant was in some sort of probationary status because she was a "new hire". In fact, the claimant had worked for many years for the various companies which serviced the contract. The claimant may have been a new hire to the current employer, but her probationary status was irrelevant. The proper question was whether the claimant's act or omission was misconduct or gross misconduct.

This was an isolated incident. The employer did not prove any pattern of behavior, or any willful disregard for its expectations. The employer did not establish that the claimant had been warned about similar past acts. The employer may have had the right to discharge the claimant for this one incident, but that does not automatically elevate it to the level necessary to support a benefit disqualification or penalty.

The Board finds that this single isolated incident of returning late from her lunch break does not rise to the level of misconduct.

The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer has not met its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of gross misconduct within the meaning of §8-1002, or misconduct within the meaning of §8-1003. The decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.

DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged, but not for gross misconduct or misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002 or 1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment with DIVERSIFIED SRVC CONTRACTING.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.



Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson



Clayton A. Mitchell, Sr., Associate Member

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Copies mailed to:

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DIVERSIFIED SRVC CONTRACTING

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