

-DECISION-

Claimant:
BARBARA A COLOM

Decision No.: 5736-BH-12

Date: November 28, 2012

Appeal No.: 1202348

Employer:
BANK OF AMERICA N A

S.S. No.:

L.O. No.: 64

Appellant: Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the Md. Code Annotated Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 1002-1002.1 (Gross/Aggravated Misconduct connected with the work), 1003 (Misconduct connected with the work) or 1001 (Voluntary Quit for good cause).

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the *Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200*.

The period for filing an appeal expires: December 28, 2012

- APPEARANCES -

FOR THE CLAIMANT:

BARBARA A. COLON

FOR THE EMPLOYER:

VALERIE MORTON, VP
Banking Center Manager

EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE

The Board of Appeals has considered all of the evidence presented, including the testimony offered at the hearing. The Board has also considered all of the documentary evidence introduced in this case, as well as the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation's documents in the appeal file.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training*, 309 Md. 28 (1987).

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d)*; *COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

In the instant case, the Board gives more weight to the claimant's testimony than the employer's witness' testimony. The employer's testimony was substantially hearsay. While hearsay is admissible in an administrative proceeding, it is usually given less weight than credible, first-hand testimony. Although the hearing examiner may rely on hearsay evidence in making his determination, the hearing examiner must, "first carefully consider[] its reliability and probative value." *Travers v. Baltimore Police Dept.*, 115 Md. App. 395, 413 (1997); also see *Kade v. Charles H. Hickey School*, 80 Md. App. 721, 725 (1989) ("[e]ven though hearsay is admissible, there are limits on its use. The hearsay must be competent and have probative force.").

One important consideration for a hearing body is the nature of the hearsay evidence. For instance, statements that are sworn under oath, see *Kade*, 80 Md. App. at 726, 566 A.2d at 151, *Eichberg v. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy*, 50 Md. App. 189, 194, 436 A.2d 525, 529, or made close in time to the incident, see *Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971), or corroborated, see *Consolidated Edison v. N.L.R.B.*, 305 U.S. 197, 230, 83 L. Ed. 126, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938) ("mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence"); *Wallace v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Bd.*, 294 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. 1972), ordinarily is presumed to possess a greater caliber of reliability. Cited in *Travers* 115 Md. App. at 413. Also see *Parham v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation*, 985 A.2d 147, 155 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); *Cook v. National Aquarium in Baltimore*, 1034-BR-91 (the employer offered not a single specific example of the alleged misconduct as observed or testified to by either of the employer's witnesses and no documents were

introduced relating to any specific instance of misconduct. The employer offered only conclusory statements that the claimant engaged in a certain type of misconduct).

The Board is persuaded that the claimant did not violate workplace rules and acted in accordance with her supervisor's permission while performing her duties.

The Board notes that the *Agency Fact Finding Report* was not offered or admitted into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The claimant was employed as a senior teller from July 2, 1990 through December 5, 2011. The claimant is unemployed as the result of a discharge.

The claimant was discharged for allegedly leaving cash unsecured and for not adequately protecting confidential and proprietary information. The claimant was overwhelmed with performing her job as there was insufficient assistance available. The claimant was not at all times able to adequately fulfill multiple job tasks at once. When the claimant had to leave her work station, she sufficiently complied with all work rules or she did so with her supervisor's informed permission. The claimant worked to the best of her ability.

Notwithstanding, on December 5, 2011, the claimant was discharged.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc.*, 164-BH-83; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc.*, 30-BR-85; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation*, 869-BH-87; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction*, 347-BH-89; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co.*, 441-BH-89.

As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider*, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998), "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005).

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (See, *Rogers v. Radio Shack*, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113).

Simple misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1003 does not require intentional misbehavior. *DLLR v. Hider*, 349 Md. 71 (1998); also see *Johns Hopkins University v. Board of Labor, Licensing and Regulation*, 134 Md. App. 653, 662-63 (2000)(psychiatric condition which prevented claimant from conforming his/her conduct to accepted norms did not except that conduct from the category of misconduct under § 8-1003). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. *Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd.*, 218 Md. 504 (1959). Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make an act connected with the work. *Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202 (1958). Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. *Id.*

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc.*, 221-BR-89. Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman*, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998).

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones*, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989). "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct...but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct.'" *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)(internal citation omitted); also see *Hernandez v. DLLR*, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998).

Aggravated misconduct is an amplification of gross misconduct where the claimant engages in "behavior committed with actual malice and deliberate disregard for the property, safety or life of others that...affects the employer, fellow employees, subcontractors, invitees of the employer, members of the public, or the ultimate consumer of the employer's products or services...and consists of either a physical assault or property loss so serious that the penalties of misconduct or gross misconduct are not sufficient."

Discharging a claimant for inefficiency or incompetence is not misconduct. *Cumor v. Computers Communications Group*, 902-BH-87. A mere showing of substandard performance is not sufficient to prove gross misconduct or misconduct. *Todd v. Harkless Construction*, 714-BR-89; *Knight v. Vincent Butler, Esquire*, 585-BR-91. Failing to use good judgment, or an isolated case of ordinary negligence, in the absence of a showing of culpable negligence or deliberate action in disregard of the employer's interests is insufficient to prove misconduct. *Hider v. DLLR*, 115 Md. App. 258, 281 (1997); *Greenwood v. Royal Crown Bottling Company*, 793-BR-88.


In the instant case, the evidence supports a finding that the claimant worked to the best of her ability, followed workplace rules to the best of her ability given the staff levels and available assistance, and left her workstation only with her supervisor's permission. There is insufficient evidence that the claimant's actions constituted a violation of workplace rules, a course of wrongful conduct or the commission of a forbidden act. There is insufficient evidence that the claimant's actions were deliberate, willful or made with a gross disregard to her employer's interests.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1003. The hearing examiner's decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.


DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged, but not for gross misconduct or misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002 or 1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment with BANK OF AMERICA NA.


The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.



Clayton A. Mitchell, Sr., Associate Member



Eileen M. Rehrmann, Associate Member



Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson

RD

Date of hearing: September 25, 2012

Copies mailed to:

BARBARA A. COLOM

BANK OF AMERICA N A

BANK OF AMERICA N A

Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary