-DECISION-

Claimant:
JERMAINE L AYRES

Employer:
DOUGH ROLLER INC

Decision No.: 921-BR-13

Date: March 15, 2013

Appeal No.: 1237970

S.S. No.:

L.O. No.: 63

Appellant: Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1001.

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the *Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200.*

The period for filing an appeal expires: April 14, 2013

REVIEW OF THE RECORD

After a review of the record, the Board adopts the following findings of fact and reverses the hearing examiner's decision.

The claimant was employed as a full-time dishwasher from April 16, 2012 through July 13, 2012. The claimant is unemployed as the result of a discharge.

On July 14, 2012, the employer sent the claimant home because of a lack of work. The claimant called the employer for his schedule and was told that he was not on the schedule for the next two weeks. The claimant attempted to contact a manager but never received a return phone call. The claimant was discharged.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-102(c).* Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training, 309 Md. 28 (1987).*

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d); COMAR 09.32.06.04.* The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1).*

A threshold issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the claimant was discharged. For the following reasons, the Board affirms the hearing examiner's decision on this issue.

The burden of proof in this case is allocated according to whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the employer discharged the claimant. In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83; Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85; Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87; Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89; Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89.*

When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, he has the burden of proving that he left for good cause or valid circumstances based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83; Chisholm v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 66-BR-89.* Purely personal reasons, no matter how compelling, cannot constitute good cause as a matter of law. *Bd. Of Educ. Of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22 (1985).* An objective standard is used to determine if the average employee would have left work in that situation; in addition, a determination is made as to whether a particular employee left in good faith, and an element of good faith is whether the claimant has exhausted all reasonable alternatives before leaving work. *Board of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22 (1985); also see Bohrer v. Sheetz, Inc., Law No. 13361, (Cir. Ct. for Washington Co., Apr. 24, 1984).* The "necessitous or compelling" requirement relating to a cause for leaving work voluntarily does not apply to "good cause". *Board of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22 (1985).* A resignation in lieu of discharge is a discharge under *§§ 8-1002, 8-1002.1,* and *8-1003. Miller v. William T. Burnette and Company, Inc., 442-BR-82.*

The intent to discharge or the intent to voluntarily quit can be manifested by words or actions. "Due to leaving work voluntarily" has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally and of his or her own free will, terminated the employment. *Allen v. Core Target Youth Program, 275 Md. 69 (1975).*

A claimant's intent or state of mind is a factual issue for the Board of Appeals to resolve. *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Taylor, 108 Md. 250(1996), aff'd sub. nom., 344 Md. 687 (1997).* An intent to quit one's job can be manifested by actions as well as words. *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-*

82. A resignation submitted in response to charges which *might* lead to discharge is a voluntary quit. *Hickman v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 973-BR-88*; *Brewington v. Dept. of Social Services, 1500-BH-82*; *Roffe v. South Carolina Wateroe River Correction Institute, 576-BR-88* (where a claimant quit because he feared a discharge was imminent, but he had not been informed that he was discharged is without good cause or valid circumstances); *also see Cofield v. Apex Grounds Management, Inc., 309-BR-91.* When a claimant receives a medical leave of absence but is still believes she is unable to return upon the expiration of that leave and expresses that she will not return to work for an undefinable period, the claimant is held to have voluntarily quit. *See Sortino v. Western Auto Supply, 896-BR-83.*

The intent to discharge can be manifested by actions as well as words. The issue is whether the reasonable person in the position of the claimant believed in good faith that he was discharged. *See Dei Svaldi v. Martin Taubenfeld, D.D.S., P.A., 1074-BR-88* (the claimant was discharged after a telephone conversation during which she stated her anger at the employer and the employer stated to her, "If that's the way you feel, then you might as well not come in anymore." The claimant's reply of "Fine" does not make it a quit). *Compare, Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-82.* A quit in lieu of discharge is a discharge for unemployment insurance purposes. *Tressler v. Anchor Motor Freight, 105-BR-83.*

In the instant case, the Board finds that the employer, through its actions, manifested the intent to discharge the claimant. On July 14, 2012 the employer sent the claimant home because of a lack of work. The claimant contacted the employer and was informed that he was not on the schedule for the next two weeks. The claimant subsequently attempted to contact a manager but never received a return phone call. There is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the claimant's position was filled by replacement workers. It was reasonable, therefore, for the claimant to believe that he was discharged. The claimant did not sufficiently manifest an intent to voluntarily quit.

The Board finds that the hearing examiner unduly relied upon the employer's statements contained in the Agency's *Fact Finding Report*. *See Agency Exhibit 1.* The statements were used for the truth of the matter asserted and are hearsay. The employer, duly notified of the date, time and place of the hearing, failed to appear. The only statement from the employer is contained in the *Agency Fact Finding Report.* Although the Agency *Fact Finding Report* is a public document, the statements contained therein are hearsay. While hearsay is admissible in an administrative proceeding, it is usually given less weight than credible, first-hand testimony. Although the hearing examiner may rely on hearsay evidence in making his determination, the hearing examiner must, "first carefully consider[] its reliability and probative value." *Travers v. Baltimore Police Dept., 115 Md. App. 395, 413 (1997)*; *also see Kade v. Charles H. Hickey School, 80 Md. App. 721, 725 (1989)* ("[e]ven though hearsay is admissible, there are limits on its use. The hearsay must be competent and have probative force."). In the instant case, the hearing examiner unreasonably relied upon hearsay evidence as the basis of the decision.

The Board gives more weight to the claimant's first-hand testimony than the employer's hearsay statements. The Board finds that the claimant was discharged.

Finding that the claimant was discharged, the Board shall now examine whether it was for a disqualifying reason.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the

credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83*; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85*; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87*; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89*; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

> As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998)*, "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005).

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (*See, Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113*).

Simple misconduct within the meaning of *§ 8-1003* does not require intentional misbehavior. *DLLR v. Hider, 349 Md. 71 (1998)*; *also see Johns Hopkins University v. Board of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 134 Md. App. 653, 662-63 (2000)*(psychiatric condition which prevented claimant from conforming his/her conduct to accepted norms did not except that conduct from the category of misconduct under *§ 8-1003*). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. *Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd., 218 Md. 504 (1959)*. Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make an act connected with the work. *Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202 (1958)*. Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. *Id.*

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc., 221-BR-89*. Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998)*.

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989)*. "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct…but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct." *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)*(internal citation omitted); *also see Hernandez v. DLLR, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998)*.

Aggravated misconduct is an amplification of gross misconduct where the claimant engages in "behavior committed with actual malice and deliberate disregard for the property, safety or life of others that…affects the employer, fellow employees, subcontractors, invitees of the employer, members of the public, or the ultimate consumer of the employer's products or services…and consists of either a physical assault or property loss so serious that the penalties of misconduct or gross misconduct are not sufficient."

Where the employer is not present and the claimant credibly denies each of the employer's allegations made to the claims specialist a finding of misconduct is not supported. *Lipman v. Graphics Factory, Inc., 697-BR-90.* A claimant does not have to prove why the employer fired him. *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Company, 441-BH-89.*

The Board finds insufficient evidence that the claimant's actions rose to the level of misconduct. Because the employer was not present, there is insufficient evidence that the claimant's attendance constituted a course of wrongful conduct or a violation of a workplace rule.

The Board finds that the hearing examiner lost her judicial neutrality by prosecuting the employer's case instead of merely being a fact-finder. The hearing examiner cross-examined the claimant in an overly aggressive manner especially regarding the statements contained in the *Agency Fact Finding Report.*

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of misconduct within the meaning of *§ 8-1003.* The decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.

DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged, but not for gross misconduct or misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002 or 1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment with DOUGH ROLLER INC.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.

Clayton A. Mitchell, Sr., Associate Member

Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson

KJK

Copies mailed to:
JERMAINE L. AYRES
DOUGH ROLLER INC
DOUGH ROLLER
Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION

JERMAINE L AYRES

SSN #

Claimant

vs.

DOUGH ROLLER INC

Employer/Agency

Before the:
Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation
Division of Appeals
1100 North Eutaw Street
Room 511
Baltimore, MD 21201
(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1237970
Appellant: Claimant
Local Office : 63 / CUMBERLAND CLAIM CENTER

December 21, 2012

For the Claimant: PRESENT

For the Employer:

For the Agency:

ISSUE(S)

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD. Code Annotated Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 1002 - 1002.1 (Gross/Aggravated Misconduct connected with the work), 1003 (Misconduct connected with the work) or 1001 (Voluntary Quit for good cause).

FINDINGS OF FACT

Claimant, Jermaine L. Ayers, filed a claim for benefits establishing a benefit year beginning, October 7, 2012, and qualified for a weekly benefit amount of $347.00.

Claimant began working for employer, Dough Roller Inc., on or about April 16, 2012. At the time of separation, the claimant was working full time as a dishwasher. Claimant last worked for employer on July 13, 2012, before quitting under the following circumstances:

Rumors were circulating in the workplace that claimant and another dishwasher were going to be replaced by family members of employer who were moving to the State. Neither claimant's supervisor nor any other management personnel, however, mentioned anything to claimant that his job was in jeopardy. Employer

did hire one (1) additional dishwasher while claimant worked for employer.

When claimant arrived for work on Saturday, July 14, 2012, he was sent home by employer because he was not needed that day. Claimant was scheduled to work the following day. He called the employer after the start of his shift to see if employer wanted him to come to work. Claimant never got to talk to a manager, in fact, someone at work hung up on him. He did speak to one of his co-workers who told claimant he had been taken off the schedule for the next two (2) weeks.

In light of the rumors that he was going to be replaced and that he could not get a manager to talk to him on the 15th, claimant did not return to work and made no attempt to contact employer.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits when unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily. The Court of Appeals interpreted Section 8-1001 in Allen v. CORE Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975): "As we see it, the phrase 'leaving work voluntarily' has a plain, definite and sensible meaning…; it expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally, of his or her own free will, terminated the employment." 275 Md. at 79.

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits where unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer, or without valid circumstances. A circumstance is valid only if it is (i) a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit; or (ii) of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

The Hearing Examiner considered all of the testimony and evidence of record in reaching this decision. Where the evidence was in conflict, the Hearing Examiner decided the Facts on the credible evidence as determined by the Hearing Examiner.

Claimant had the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he voluntarily quit his position for reasons that constitute either good cause or valid circumstances pursuant to the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83. In this case, this burden has not been met.

Claimant's testimony failed to establish that employer took action that indicated he was or would be terminated. Claimant's testimony established that he manifested intent to quit when he failed to return to his job after July 13, 2012.

Claimant has an affirmative obligation to confirm the status of his employment from a manager. Claimant relied on rumors and innuendos not facts in making his decision to quit.

Claimant did not establish he was about to be terminated or that employer made material changes to the terms of his employment that would have afforded claimant good cause to quit. Claimant did not establish a compelling and necessitous personal reason to quit within the meaning of valid circumstances.

It is thus determined that claimant has failed to demonstrate that the reason for quitting rises to the level necessary to demonstrate good cause or valid circumstances within the meaning of the sections of law cited above.

DECISION

IT IS FURTHER HELD THAT the claimant's unemployment was due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause or valid circumstances within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001. Benefits are denied for the week beginning July 8, 2012, and until the claimant becomes reemployed and earns at least 15 times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in covered wages and thereafter becomes unemployed through no fault of the claimant.

The determination of the Claims Specialist is reversed.

B. Woodland-Hargrove

B H Woodland-Hargrove, Esq.
Hearing Examiner

Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment. This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.

Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.

Notice of Right of Further Appeal

Any party may request a further appeal either in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A (1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by January 07, 2013. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals
1100 North Eutaw Street
Room 515
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Fax 410-767-2787
Phone 410-767-2781

NOTE: Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.

Date of hearing: November 28, 2012
DAH/Specialist ID: WCU1P
Seq No: 001
Copies mailed on December 21, 2012 to:

JERMAINE L. AYRES
DOUGH ROLLER INC
LOCAL OFFICE #63